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  The purpose of this paper is to investigate the choice of invoice currency under exchange rate 
uncertainty.  The analysis is motivated by the fact that the U.S. dollar has been the dominant vehicle 
currency in developing countries.  The theoretical analysis is based on an open economy model of 
monopolistic competition.  The export prices are set before exchange rates are known.  When the 
market is competitive enough, the exporting firms tend to set their prices not to deviate from those of 
the competitors.  As a result, when the other exporters set their prices in the third currency, the 
exporting firm tends to choose the third currency as an equilibrium invoice currency.  The tendency 
becomes conspicuous in the market where the shares of local firms are small.  The latter part of the 
paper empirically investigates the relevancy of the theoretical results by using the export price data in 
Korea.  We find that export prices in Korea are highly stable in terms of the US dollar even in the 
commodities for which Japan has had dominant shares.  We also find that export prices in Korea are 
more stable against the US dollar in the commodities for which the shares of local firms are small in 
Japan. The empirical results are consistent with our theoretical model.  The result may explain why 
the firm tends to set prices in the US dollar even if the United States is not a trade partner. 
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1. Introduction 
  The purpose of this paper is to investigate the choice of invoice currency in international trade. There 
are several theoretical studies that investigated the choice of invoice currency in international trade.  
Baron (1976) and Giovannini (1988) are their early attempts.
1  Most of the studies analyzed whether 
the exporting firm sets prices in its own currency or in the importer’s currency.  It is, however, well 
known that some of international trades are invoiced in a third currency, that is, vehicle currency.  In 
particular, the U.S. dollar tends to be the dominant vehicle currency in developing countries.  By using 
an open economy model of monopolistic competition, this paper tries to explain the choice of invoice 
currency in developing countries.  
  Except for primary commodities, the role of vehicle currency is relatively limited in international 
trade among developed countries (see Magee and Rao [1980]).  The U.S. dollar is, however, the 
dominant vehicle currency in many developing countries.
2  For example, Table 1 reports the ratios of 
currencies used for payments in Thai international trade.  It shows that payments in the US dollar have 
been dominant in Thai exports, although the ratios of the US dollar showed marginal declines in 
recent years (see Table 1a).  The results hold true even if the export destinations are East Asian 
countries or European countries.  In particular, the payment ratio of the Japanese yen is less than 10% 
even in Thai exports to Japan (see Table 1b).  A similar result is observed for the currency ratios used 
for payments in Korean exports.  In Korea, the dominant ratios of the US dollar declined during a past 
decade years (Table 2).  However, even in recent years, the ratios of the US dollar still lied between 
85% and 90% in Korean visible exports and around 75% in Korean invisible trades. 
  Table 3 summarizes the shares of each export destination from Korea and Thailand.  We can see that 
Japan and Western Europe as well as other Asian countries have been the other important trade 
partners for Thai and Korean exports.   The above evidence indicates that the U.S. dollar was chosen 
as the dominant vehicle currency even in the case where the United States is not a trade partner.  
  One may argue that these countries chose the U.S. dollar as the dominant invoice currency because 
their exchange rates were stable against the U.S. dollar.  The argument may have been true before the 
Asian crisis when they effectively pegged their currencies to the U.S. dollar (see, for example, Frankel 
and Wei [1994]).  However, after the crisis, these countries shifted the exchange rate regime from de 
fact dollar peg to float.  As a result, there is no longer a natural reason for them to choose the U.S. 
dollar as the dominant invoice currency to stabilize their export prices in terms of domestic currencies. 
  The following theoretical analysis is based on an open economy model of monopolistic competition.  
Since the export prices are set before exchange rates are known, the exporting firms face uncertainty 
                                                           
1 McKinnon (1979) is another seminal study that addressed this issue. 
2 The authors such as Ito (1993), Fukuda (1995), and Kawai (1996) discussed why the Japanese yen has not 
been used in international trade.  
 1of exchange rates.  If necessary, the exporting firm set prices in its own currency or in the currency of 
the importing country.  However, when the market is competitive enough, the exporting firms tend to 
set prices not to deviate from those of the competitors.  As a result, when the other exporters set their 
prices in the third currency, the exporting firms tends to invoice in the third currency.  The tendency 
becomes conspicuous in the market where the shares of local firms are small. 
  Our model follows a partial equilibrium model in Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2002).  It, however, 
has two distinctive features that the previous study did not have.  First, we allow the exporting firms to 
choose the third currency as an invoice currency.  In developing countries, the exporting firms are 
under competition because of less differentiated products.  It is thus a natural choice for the exporting 
firm to set prices in the third currency when the competitors set their prices in the third currency.  
Secondly, we show that coordination failures can lead the third currency to be an equilibrium invoice 
currency.  Since multiple equilibria are Pareto ranked, it implies that the equilibrium choice of the 
invoice currency may lead to a less efficient equilibrium.    
  The latter part of the paper empirically investigates the relevancy of the theoretical results by using 
the export price data in Korea.  The approach follows Fukuda and Ji (1994) that studied the pricing 
behavior of Japanese firms.  We find that the export prices in Korea were highly stable in terms of the 
US dollar even in the commodities for which Japan had dominant shares.  We also find that the export 
prices in Korea were more stable against the US dollar in the commodities for which the shares of 
local firms are small.  The results are consistent with our theoretical model.  They are, however, 
inconsistent with pricing-to-the-market models that have provided the dominant approaches in 
previous literature.  Since the exporting products are less differentiated in developing countries, the 
exporting firms are under competition when they choose the invoice currency.  The result thus 
explains why the firm tends to set prices in the US dollar even if the United States is not a trade 
partner in developing countries.   
  In previous literature, some exceptional studies explored the role of vehicle currency in international 
trade.  Krugman (1980) and Rey (2001) show that transaction costs might make vehicle currency a 
dominant medium of exchange in international trade.  These studies are, however, successful only in 
explaining the role of vehicle currency as a medium of exchange, through which transactions between 
currencies are made.  In contrast, our approach tries to explain the role of vehicle currency as a unit 
account in terms of which prices of commodities are set.  A unit account is another important function 
of vehicle currency.  Friberg (1998) is an exceptional study that investigated the role of vehicle 
currency as a unit account.  Assuming that the exporter commits to sell the demanded quantity at the 
ex post realized price, he explored under what conditions the monopolistic exporter chooses the third 
currency as vehicle currency.  It was, however, demonstrated that setting price in the importer’s 
currency yields the highest expected profits for the exporters under reasonable demand and cost 
functions.  Friberg thus cannot explain why the vehicle currency tends to be a dominant invoice 
 2currency in international trade with developing countries.  It has been widely observed that export 
prices are stable in terms of the US dollar in developing countries.  We will show that the exporters’ 
pricing behavior is consistent with our model in developing countries.   
 
 
2. The Model of Export Pricing Behavior under Uncertainty 
The purpose of this section is to present the theoretical framework that discusses pricing behavior 
under uncertainty.  The firms studied are exporters who produce only in their home country.  For 
simplicity, we assume that all exporting firms are identical and sell all of their products in a single 
foreign market.  There are three countries: the exporting country, the importing country, and the third 
country.  The third country has no international trade with the other two countries.  Each exporter, 
however, has the choice between setting the export price in its own, in the importers’, or in the third 
currencies.  The exchange rates s0 and s are exogenous and assumed to be the only source of 
uncertainty. Selling s0 units of the third currency leads to one unit of the exporter’s currency on the 
spot market and selling s units of the importers’ currency leads to one unit of the exporter’s currency 
on the spot market.  By definition, the exchange rate between the exporter’s and the third currency is 
given by the relation s/s0.  We denote their variances as σ0
2 ≡ E (s0 - E s0)
2 and σ
2 ≡ E (s - E s)
2.  For 
analytical simplicity, we assume that s0 and s are uncorrelated, so that E (s0 - E s0)(s - E s) = 0. 
  In the following analysis, each exporter is under monopolistic competition and firm j faces the 
demand function D(pj, P*), where pj is the price set by the firm j measured in the importers’ currency.  
P* is the aggregate price index in the importers’ local market denominated in the importers’ currency.  
It is generally a function of prices set by local firms and prices set by exporting firms.  The importers’ 
local firms always set their prices in the importers’ currency, so that the price set by domestic firms is 
independent of the exchange rate.  The exporting firms, however, set their prices either in its own, in 
the importers’, or in the third currencies.  The aggregate price index P* thus depends on the exchange 
rate unless all exporting firms set their prices in the importers’ currency.  We assume that the total 
number of firms is large enough so that an individual firm does not affect the price index P*. 
The objective of each exporter is to maximize the expected profits in terms of his home currency.  
The central assumptions are that the exporter has to set price before the exchange rates are known and 
that demand is a function of the price that importers face after exchange rate uncertainty is resolved.  
Suppose that each exporter chooses p
E when setting a price in its own currency, p
I when setting a price 
in the importers’ currency, and p
0 when setting a price in the third currency.  By definition, the unit 
price of imports in terms of the importers’ currency is p
E/s when set in the exporters’ currency, p
I 
when invoiced in the importers’ currency, and p




0 respectively denote the exporter’s profit when the price pj is set in its own, in the importers’, or 





E/s, P*) – C[D(p
E/s, P*)], 
 (2) Π
I = s p
I D(p
I, P*) – C[D(p
I, P*)], 
 (3) Π
0 = (s/s0) p
0 D(p
0/s0, P*) – C[D(p
0/s0, P*)], 
 
where C[·] is cost function that is increasing and convex.  We assume that the costs are incurred in 
terms of the exporter’s currency.    
 
 
3. The Nash Equilibria  
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 E.  The optimal choice of the currency denomination thus generally depends on the forms of 
demand and cost functions.  Let Π
E(s0, s), Π
I(s0, s), and Π
o(s0, s) be profit functions in its own, in the 
importers’, or in the third currencies respectively.  Then, a second order Taylor expansion near s0 = E 
s0 and s = E s leads to 
 
 (4)  EΠ
j(s0, s) ≈ Π
















2 at s0 = E s0 and s = E s.  
It is noteworthy that the choice of the currency denomination becomes irrelevant under certainty.  It 
thus holds that  
 
(5)  Π
E(E s0, E s) = Π
I(E s0, E s) = Π
o(E s0, E s), 
(6)  p
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and that when ∂P*/∂ s0 = 0, 
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(10)    EΠ
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2Π
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2), 
(12)    EΠ
I - EΠ




2 + 2 [(∂
2Π
E/∂ P*∂ s) - (∂
2Π
I/∂ P*∂ s)](∂P*/∂ s)}σ
2. 
 
Based on (7)-(12), we investigate which currency the exporters denominate their product in a Nash 
equilibrium.  We first explore whether the denomination in the importers’ currency can be a Nash 
equilibrium.  Assuming symmetry, we consider the case where ∂P*/∂ s = ∂P*/∂ s0 = 0.  This is the 
case where all of the other exporting firms set their prices in the importers’ currency.  Equations (7)-














2 ≤ 0. 
 




 o, this 
implies that the denomination in the importers’ currency is a Nash equilibrium only if (13) holds.  
Each of two inequalities in (13) does not always hold under general demand and cost functions.  We 
can, however, see that each inequality always holds when each profit function is concave in each 
exchange rate around its expected value. 
We can similarly investigate whether the denomination in the third currency can be a Nash 
equilibrium.  Assuming symmetry, we consider the case where ∂P*/∂ s = 0 but ∂P*/∂ s0 ≠ 0.  This is 
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This implies that the denomination in the third currency is a Nash equilibrium only if both (14) and 
(15) hold. 
We finally investigate whether the denomination in the exporters’ currency can be a Nash 
equilibrium.  Assuming symmetry, we consider the case where ∂P*/∂ s0 = 0 but ∂P*/∂ s ≠ 0.  This is 
the case where some of the other exporting firms set their prices in the exporter’s currency.  Equations 




 o if and only if 
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2Π
E/∂ P*∂ s) - (∂
2Π
I/∂ P*∂ s)](∂P*/∂ s) ≥ 0, 











E/∂ P*∂ s) - (∂
2Π
I/∂ P*∂ s)](∂P*/∂ s)} σ
2. 
 
This implies that the denomination in the exporters’ currency is a Nash equilibrium only if both (16) 
and (17) hold.   
It is interesting to note that both (14) and (15) can hold even if (13) holds and that both (16) and 
(17) can hold even if (13) holds.  This indicates that the model can have multiple Nash equilibria for 
some demand and cost functions.  Since multiple equilibria are Pareto ranked, coordination failures 
may thus make the equilibrium choice of invoice currency less efficient. 
 
 
4. The Case of CES preferences 
When we specify the demand and cost functions, our equilibrium conditions are solved explicitly.  
We consider the following set of constant elasticity demand and cost functions. 
 
(18) D(pj, P*) = A (pj/P*)
-µ, 
(19)  C(D) = B D
η,  
 
where µ > 1 and η > 1. 
If the importers have CES preferences with elasticity µ > 1 among the different products, we can 
specify the demand for goods from firm j as (18).  In this case, the aggregate price index in the 
importers’ local market P* is given by 
 
  (20)  P* =



















where N is the number of firms in the importers’ local market and pi is a price set by exporting firm i 
in the importers’ currency.  In the local market, a fraction f of firms is identical exporting firms and a 
fraction 1-f is identical local firms.  Let pj denote a price set by exporting firm j in the importers’ 
currency and p
D a price set by local firms in the importers’ currency.  The overall price index faced by 
foreign country consumers is then 
 
  (21)  P* =
) 1 /( 1
1
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 6We assume that the local firms always set their prices in the local currency, that is, in the importers’ 
currency.  Then, p
D is always independent of the exchange rate.  The exporting firms, however, set 
their prices either in its own, in the importers’, or in the third currencies.  The price index thus 
depends on the exchange rate unless the exporting firms set their prices in the importers’ currency. 
Under (18) and (19), each profit function is respectively written as 
 
 (22)  Π
E = A p
E [(p
E/s) / P*)]




 (23)  Π
I = A s p
I (p
I /P*)




 (24)  Π
0 = A (s/s0) p
0 [(p
0/s0) / P*)]





Assuming that all domestic and exporting firms are identical under certainty, it holds that P* = p
D = 
p
E/E s = p
I = p
0/E s0.  The first-order conditions thus lead to 
 
 (25)  p
E = p
I E s = p
0(E s /E s0) = A
η-1B µη/(µ-1). 
 
at s0 = E s0 and s = E s.  In addition, after some tedious calculations shown in Appendix 2, we can 
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2 = - (1/s)
 2 p
E (µ-1)[µ(η-1) - 1], 
(28)  ∂
2Π
0/∂ P*∂ s0 = - (p
E/p0)
 (µ-1) µ(η-1) < 0, 
(29)  ∂
2Π
E/∂ P*∂ s = - µ[µ(η-1) - η], 
(30)  ∂
2Π
I/∂ P*∂ s = µ , 
(31)  ∂P*/∂ p = f. 
 
Equations (26) and (27) imply that the condition (13) holds if and only if 
 
(32)  µ(η-1) ≥ 1. 
 
The denomination in the importers’ currency is thus a Nash equilibrium if and only if (32) holds.  On 
the other hand, from equations (28)-(31), we can show that the condition (14) holds if and if  
 
(33)    µ(η-1)(2f-1) ≥ 1, 
 
and that the condition (16) holds if and if  
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(34)  µ(η-1)(2fh-1) + 1 ≥ 0, 
 





2< 0 when (33) holds, the condition (15) holds if (33) holds.  This implies that the 





2 < 0, the condition (17) holds if (16) holds.  The denomination in the exporters’ currency is 
therefore a Nash equilibrium if and only if (34) holds.   
Among the above three inequalities, the condition (34) is the only inequality that holds when µ(η-1) 
< 1.  Since the parameter µ becomes small when the importers’ local market is less competitive, the 
denomination in the exporters’ currency is thus a Nash equilibrium when the local market is less 
competitive.  This implies that the exports of differentiated products, which prevail in developing 
countries, tend to be denominated the exporters’ currency. 
In contrast, when µ(η-1) ≥ 1, the denomination in the importers’ currency is always a Nash 
equilibrium.  Since the parameter µ becomes large enough when the local market is competitive, this 
indicates that the denomination in the importers’ currency is a Nash equilibrium in the competitive 
local market.  However, when µ(η-1) ≥ 1, Nash equilibrium may not be unique in general.  The 
denomination in the third currency is another Nash equilibrium when 2f-1 ≥ 1/[µ(η-1)].  The 
denomination in the exporters’ currency is another Nash equilibrium when 2fh-1 ≥ - 1/[µ(η-1)].  When 
the market is competitive, the model therefore has multiple Nash equilibria for some parameter set, 
particular when a fraction of exporting firms in the importers’ local market f is large. 
When the local market is competitive enough, the exporting firms tend to keep their prices not to 
deviate from those of the competitors.  As a result, when the other exporters are expected to set their 
prices in some currency, the exporting firm tends to set its price in the same currency.  The 
denomination in the arbitrary currency can therefore be a Nash equilibrium depending on the 
expectations on the choice of invoice currency of the other exporters. 
Because of the less differentiated exporting products, the exporters in developing countries tend to 
face serious competition in the importers’ local markets.  The above result thus indicates that when a 
fraction of exporting firms is large in the local market, the choice of invoice currency can be arbitrary 
in the exports from developing countries.  In particular, since the US dollar has historically been the 
dominant invoice currency in most developing countries, the exporters in the developing countries 
may not have an incentive to change their invoice currency from the US dollar to the other currency 
even if the United States is not a trade partner.  It is noteworthy that multiple equilibria are Pareto 




5. Empirical Evidence 
(i) Framework 
It is well known that the U.S. dollar has been the dominant vehicle currency in many developing 
countries.  In particular, as we showed in introduction, payments by the US dollar have been dominant 
in most East Asian countries even though other East Asian countries, particularly Japan, are important 
trade partners.  There is, however, no direct evidence that shows how dominant the use of US dollar 
was as “contract currency” of export prices in the East Asian countries.  The contract currency is 
usually the same as the payment currency in international trade.  The role of medium of exchange is, 
however, theoretically different from that of a unit account in international trade.  We thus need some 
formal tests to examine to what extent export prices are stable in terms of the US dollar in most of 
East Asian international trade. 
This section empirically investigates the stability of export prices against the US dollar in Korea.  
We used the export prices in Korea because the data are available for varieties of commodities.  We 
examine how the export prices of various commodities are correlated with the US dollar, the Japanese 
yen, and the Euro.  In particular, we explore whether export prices in Korea can be highly stable in 
terms of the US dollar even in the commodities which were exported to Japan.   
All data are monthly.  Define the relative export price of commodity i at time t by REPi,t ≡ EPIi,t 
/PPIi,t, where EPIi,t = the export price index of commodity i at time t and PPIi,t = the producer price 
index of commodity i at time t.  We regressed its growth rate on the growth rates of  USD (= the 
exchange rate of the US dollar), JPY (= the exchange rates of the Japanese Yen), and EUR (= the 
exchange rate of the Euro [the German Mark before December 2002]).
3  For each relative export price 
of commodity i, we estimated the following equation 
 
(35)  d REPi,t = constant + ∑ d ln USD =
K
k k a 0  t-k +  d ln JPY ∑ =
K
k k b 0  t-k +  d ln EUR ∑ =
K
k k c 0 t-k, 
 
where d REPi,t ≡ ln REPi,t – ln REPi,t-1 and d ln St-k ≡ ln St-k – ln St-k-1 for S = USD, JPY, and EUR.  
All exchange rates are monthly average rates in terms of the Korean won.  To allow the lag structure, 
we used the Almon lag, where K is the number of lags.  Some preliminary estimations could not reject 
the hypothesis that the end point constraint that a3 = b3= c3 = 0 when K = 2.  We thus estimated 
equation (35) assuming that K = 2 and imposing the end point constraint that a3 = b3= c3 = 0.
4
                                                           
3 When converting the German Mark to the Euro, we applied the euro conversion rate: 1 Euro = 1.95583 
Mark. 
4  We first estimated (35) with seasonal dummies.  None of them was, however, significant.  The following 
analysis reports the estimation results without seasonal dummies. 
 9The sum of the coefficients respectively reflects the impact of the exchange rate change on the export 
price in Korea.  That is, ∑  reflects the impact of the change of the US dollar, ∑  that of 
the change of the Japanese Yen, and ∑  that of the change of the Euro.  If the export price in 
Korea is denominated by the currency of the export destination, all of  ,  , and 
 would lie between zero and one.  In contrast, if the US dollar is the dominant invoice 
currency, ∑ would be close to one and   but  would be small. 
=
K
k k a 0 =
K
k k b 0
=
K
k k c 0
∑ =
K
k k a 0 ∑ =
K
k k b 0
∑ =
K
k k c 0
=
K
k k a 0 ∑ =
K
k k b 0 ∑ =
K
k k c 0
 
(ii) The data  
The sample period of estimations is from March 1998 to December 2002.  In order to exclude the 
turbulent period after the currency crisis, we start the sample period from March 1998.  We ended the 
sample period in December 2002 because the commodity classification of the export price index was 
revised after January 2003. 
The data of the export price index (EPIi,t) and the producer price index (PPIi,t) are downloaded from 
the website of the Bank of Korea.  The base year of each index is 1995.  The commodity 
classifications are based on “won basis Basic Groups” of each index.  Unfortunately, the 
classifications do not have one-to-one correspondences between the two indexes.   We therefore 
reclassified each classification and sorted out 21 commodities.  Among these 21 commodities, we 
excluded agricultural products and marine products from our samples because the export prices were 
highly volatile over time.  We consequently obtained 19 commodities: (1) mining products, (2) 
processed marine products, (3) plastic products, (4) non-metallic mineral products, (5) iron & steel, 
(6) basic nonferrous metals & related primary, (7) furniture, (8) footwear, (9) hand tools & general 
hardware, (10) electric machinery & apparatus, (11) precision instrument, (12) sports & leisure goods, 
(13): musical instruments, (14) rubber products, (15) general purpose machinery, (16) special purpose 
machinery, (17) radio, TV, & communication equipment, (18) transportation equipment, and (19) 
apparel.   
  The column (A) in table 4 displays the list of 19 commodities we use in the following analysis.  The 
columns (B) and (C) in table 4 summarize how each classified commodity corresponds to that in the 
export price index (EPI) and that in the producer price index (PPI)  in the following analysis.   
 
(iii) The Estimation Results 
  Table 5 summarizes the results of regressions for the 19 commodities.  The sum of the coefficient 
was significantly positive in eighteen among the 19 commodities. The exception was non- ∑ =
K
k k a 0
 10metallic mineral products in which none of  ,  , and  was significantly 
positive (No.6-1 in the table).  However, even in non-metallic mineral products, ∑ turned out 
significantly positive when we estimate (35) with the restriction that  =  = 0 (No.6-2 
in the table).  Excluding No.6-1, the average value of   was 0.837, which implies that export 
prices are highly stable in terms of the US dollar in Korean exports.  In particular,  was 
greater than 0.9 in eight commodities: mining products, plastic products, nonmetallic mineral products, 
footwear, sports & leisure goods, musical instruments, rubber products, and general purpose 
machinery.   
∑ =
K
k k a 0 ∑ =
K
k k b 0 ∑ =
K
k k c 0
=
K
k k a 0
∑ =
K
k k b 0 ∑ =
K
k k c 0
∑ =
K
k k a 0
∑ =
K
k k a 0
  In contrast, the sum of the coefficient ∑ was significantly positive in eight commodities but 
not in eleven commodities.  Even in the eight commodities in which ∑ was significantly 
positive,   was less than 0.4 except for processed marine products.  The sum of the coefficient 
was significantly positive only in one commodity and not in the other eighteen commodities.  
The results indicate that export prices in Korea had only modest correlation with the Japanese yen and 
little correlation with the Euro. 
=
K
k k b 0
=
K
k k b 0
∑ =
K
k k b 0
∑ =
K
k k c 0
 
(iv) Trade Destinations and Export Prices  
  In the last subsection, we showed that the US dollar was the dominant invoice currency in Korean 
exports.  However, interpreting the results in Table 5, we need to note that the United States is the 
largest export destination from Korea and that China and Hong Kong peg their exchange rates to the 
US dollar.  To the extent that the US dollar is dominant in invoicing the Korean exports to the United 
States, China, and Hong Kong, the results do not necessarily mean that the US dollar is the dominant 
invoice currency in Korean exports to the other countries.  The following analysis investigates 
whether export prices in Korea are highly stable in terms of the US dollar even in the commodities for 
which the United States is not a dominant export partner. 
  Table 6 summarizes the shares of the United States (US/W) and the shares of Japan (JP/W) in the 
Korean exports for each of the 19 commodities over 1998 - 2001.  It also reports the summed shares 
of China and Hong Kong [(C+HK)/W] and those of the United States, China, and Hong Kong 
[(US+C+HK)/W].  The table shows that the United States has large shares in several commodities.  In 
particular, the summed shares of the United States, China, and Hong Kong exceed 50% in eight 
commodities.  Japan, however, has large shares in several commodities.  In particular, the shares of 
Japan exceed 20% in seven commodities. 
 11  If the US dollar is the dominant invoice currency only in the Korean exports to the United States, 
export prices in Korea would be stable in terms of the US dollar only in the commodities for which the 
United States has large shares.  Because China and Hong Kong peg their exchange rates to the US 
dollar, it is also likely that the US dollar is dominant in invoicing the Korean exports to China and 
Hong Kong.  In contrast, if the US dollar is the dominant invoice currency in all of the Korean exports, 
export prices in Korea would be stable in terms of the US dollar even in the commodities for which 
Japan has large shares.   
By using the estimated coefficients in equation (35), we test these alternative hypotheses.  Denoting 
commodity i by subscript i, we estimate the following equations: 
 
(36a)   ( )i
K
k k a ∑ =0  = constant + d1 USi/Wi + d2 (C+HK) i/Wi + d3 JPi/Wi,  
(36b)   ( )i
K
k k b ∑ =0  = constant + e1 USi/Wi + e2 (C+HK) i/Wi + e3 JPi/Wi,  




k k b a ∑ ∑ = = − 0 0  = constant + g1 USi/Wi + g2 (C+HK) i/Wi + g3 JPi/Wi,  
 
where USi/Wi denotes the shares of the United States,  (C+HK) i/Wi the shares of China and Hong 
Kong, and JPi/Wi, the shares of Japan.  If the invoice currency is determined by the currency of the 
export destination, we can expect that the parameters d1, d2, e3, g1, and g2 would be significantly 
positive and that the parameter g3 would be significantly negative. 
  Table 7 reports the regression results.  In the table, all of the parameters had expected signs.  This 
implies that invoicing in the US dollar was more dominant in the Korean exports to the United States, 
China, and Hong Kong but less in the Korean exports to Japan.  However, except for g1 and g2, the 
estimated parameters were not significantly positive.  Even the parameters g1 and g2 took small 
positive values.  The results suggest that export prices in Korea were highly stable in terms of the US 
dollar even in the commodities for which Japan has had dominant shares. 
 
 
6. Consistency of our Empirical Results with our Theoretical Results 
One of the most prominent features in our theoretical model is that the third currency can be an 
equilibrium invoice currency when the exporters are under competition and when local firms have 
small shares in the market.  Because of less differentiated products, the first condition tends to hold in 
the exports from developing countries.  Our theoretical implication will thus be supported if the third 
currency is used as an invoice currency in the exports from developing countries when the second 
condition holds, that is, when a fraction of local firms is small in the market.  In this section, we 
examine this hypothesis by using the regression results in the last section.  Specifically, we explore 
 12whether the US dollar is the dominant invoice currency in the products of which local firms have 
small shares in the competitive market.   
In the analysis, we investigate how the difference in the import shares in Japan affects the choice of 
invoice currency of each commodity.  We chose the Japanese market as a representative local market 
because Japan had been the second biggest export destination for Korea for a long period.
5  If the 
theoretical hypothesis is true, we expect that invoicing in the U.S. dollar tends to be large in 
commodities for which the import share is large in the Japanese market. 
Define the import share in Japan fi as  
 
(37)   fi ≡ [the amount of imports in commodity i] / [the amount of sales in commodity i],  
 
where domestic sales ≡ total domestic production – exports + imports.  We calculate fi by using the 
2000 Input-Output Tables reported by the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry.  To avoid the 
aggregation biases, we first calculated fi ’s for basic 71 commodities and then used those for which 
imports from Korea are more relevant in Japan (see Appendix 3). 
The estimated values of ∑ reflect not only the impacts of the dollar-won exchange rate on 
Korean export prices to non-US dollar areas such as Japan but also those to the US dollar areas (i.e., 
the U.S., China, and Hong Kong).  To identify the invoice ratios in the exports to Japan, we thus need 
to subtract those to the US dollar areas from ∑ .  Define A(USD)
=
K
k k a 0
=
K
k k a 0  i as the invoice ratio in the 
exports to the US dollar areas and A(Non-USD) i as that to non-US dollar areas.  For commodity i, the 
value of  is then represented as the weighted average of A(USD) ∑ =
K
k k a 0  i and A(Non-USD) i as 
follows 
 
(38) [ ] ∑ =
K
k k a 0 i = w i · A(USD) iʴ(1-w i) · A(Non-USD) i, 
 
where w i is the ratio of Korean exports to the US dollar areas divided by Korean exports to the World.   
We use the value of (US+C+HK)/W in Table 6 for w i, and the estimates in Table 5 for [ ] ∑ =
K
k k a 0 i.  
Assuming that all of the exports to the US dollar areas are invoiced in the US dollar,  that is, A(USD) i 
≡ 1 for all i, equation (38) then leads to the estimates of A(Non-USD) i.  For Korea, a primary part of 
1-w i is the weight of the exports to Japan.  The estimates of A(Non-USD) i would therefore reflect the 
extent to which the US dollar is chosen as an invoice currency in Korean exports to Japan.  
                                                           
5 In recent years, China became the second biggest export destination for Korea. 
 13Table 8 reports the value of fi as well as the estimates of A(Non-USD) i for 19 commodities.  
Because the aggregation biases still remain, the calculated values of fi were less than 50% except for 
mining products.  We can, however, observe a tendency that A(Non-USD) i is large in commodities for 
which fi is large.  For example, fi exceeds 40% in three commodities: mining products, footwear, and 
apparel.  In these commodities, the average of A(Non-USD) i is 1.103.  In contrast, in the other sixteen 
commodities, the average of A(Non-USD) i is 0.761.  Welch’s test reveals that the former average is 
statistically greater than the latter one at the 1% significance level.  The results support our theoretical 
hypothesis that the US dollar tends to be the dominant invoice currency in the products for which local 
firms have small shares. 
When the market is competitive enough, the exporting firms tend to keep their prices not to deviate 
from those of the competitors.  As a result, when the competitors are expected to set their prices in the 
US dollar, the exporting firm tends to set its price in the same currency.  The local firms usually set 
their prices in the local currency.  To the extent that the shares of local firms are large, it is thus 
unlikely that the competitors are expected to set their prices in the US dollar outside the United States.  
However, when the shares of local firms are small, it is possible that the competitors are expected to 
set their prices in the US dollar outside the US market.  Our empirical result supports this view.   
 
 
7. Concluding Remarks 
  This paper investigated the choice of invoice currency under exchange rate uncertainty.  The analysis 
was motivated by the fact that the U.S. dollar has been the dominant vehicle currency in developing 
countries.  Our theoretical analysis was based on an open economy model of monopolistic competition.  
When the market is competitive enough, the exporting firms tend to set their prices not to deviate from 
those of the competitors.  As a result, when the other exporters set their prices in the third currency, 
the exporting firm tends to choose the third currency as the invoice currency.  The tendency becomes 
conspicuous in the market where the shares of local firms are small.  The latter part of the paper 
empirically investigated the relevancy of the theoretical results by using the export price data in Korea.  
We found that export prices in Korea were highly stable in terms of the US dollar even in the 
commodities for which Japan had dominant shares.  We also found that export prices in Korea were 
more stable against the US dollar in the commodities for which the shares of local firms were small.  
  The empirical results are consistent with our theoretical model.  They are, however, inconsistent with 
pricing-to-the-market models that have analyzed whether the exporting firm sets prices in its own 
currency or in the importer’s currency.  It is well known that some of international trades are invoiced 
in the U.S. dollar in developing countries.  Since the exporting products are less differentiated in 
developing countries, our results may provide one plausible explanation on why the exporting firms in 
developing countries tend to set prices in the US dollar even if the United States is not a trade partner.
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 15Table 1a. Structure of Export Receipts  (Percent share)
 Currencies 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
US dollar 91.8 90.5 91.0 91.7 92.0 90.6 87.6 87.0
baht 0.9 1.6 2.4 1.3 2.1 2.6 3.7 3.9
Japanese yen 3.9 4.7 4.1 4.5 3.3 3.7 5.2 5.7
Deutsche mark 1.0 0.8 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.7 1.5 1.2
Pound sterling 0.8 0.6 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.2
Euro 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.6
Singapore dollar 0.8 0.7 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.2
Others 0.8 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.5 1.7 1.2 1.2
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source) Bank of Thailand.  
 
 16classified by currency in Thailand  (Percent share)
USD JPY THB USD JPY THB
Japan 71.8 20.5 7.3 71.0 20.9 7.4
USD JPY THB USD JPY THB
NAFTA
   - USA 97.1 0.3 2.6 96.4 0.4 3.2
   - Canada 97.3 0.0 0.2 97.3 0.2 0.3
   - Mexico 99.7 0.0 0.2 98.1 0.0 0.2
Total 97.1 0.3 2.5 96.4 0.4 3.0
USD GBP DEM THB EURO Others Total
European  Union
     - Belgium 74.5 2.0 0.0 1.8 21.4 0.3 100.0
     - Denmark 92.8 0.0 0.0 2.6 2.6 2.0 100.0
     - France 87.2 0.0 0.0 0.8 11.4 0.6 100.0
     - Germany 50.1 0.0 0.2 1.1 47.8 0.8 100.0
     - Greece 81.7 0.0 0.0 0.6 17.6 0.1 100.0
     - Ireland 96.6 0.0 0.1 0.0 2.2 1.1 100.0
     - Italy 83.4 0.0 0.0 0.5 15.4 0.7 100.0
     - Luxembourg 16.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 83.1 0.2 100.0
     - Netherlands 61.4 0.0 0.0 0.3 37.4 0.9 100.0
     - Portugal 74.1 0.0 0.7 0.2 24.9 0.1 100.0
     - Spain 81.4 0.2 0.1 0.4 17.7 0.2 100.0
     - United Kingdom 88.5 6.8 0.0 2.1 2.4 0.2 100.0
     - Austria 41.2 0.0 0.2 7.5 50.9 0.2 100.0
     - Sweden 88.7 0.1 0.0 4.3 1.2 5.7 100.0
     - Finland 91.2 0.0 0.0 0.8 6.5 1.5 100.0
Total 73.0 2.1 0.1 1.3 22.9 0.6 100.0
USD JPY THB SGD MYR Others Total
ASEAN
     - Singapore 91.6 2.2 3.3 1.3 0.0 1.6 100.0
     - Indonesia 79.2 2.8 10.3 0.2 0.0 7.5 100.0
     - Philippines 84.2 1.9 5.9 6.8 0.0 1.2 100.0
     - Malaysia 93.3 1.1 3.8 0.4 0.8 0.6 100.0
     - Brunei Darussalam 64.5 0.4 9.3 25.2 0.0 0.6 100.0
     - Cambodia 47.0 0.2 52.0 0.4 0.0 0.4 100.0
     - Laos 49.3 0.2 49.9 0.0 0.0 0.6 100.0
     - Myanmar 65.6 0.2 33.7 0.0 0.1 0.4 100.0
     - Vietnam 95.9 0.5 3.5 0.0 0.0 0.1 100.0
Total 89.0 1.9 6.1 1.3 0.1 1.6 100.0
Source) Bank of Thailand.
Table 1b. Structure of export receipts from major trading partners
Partner Country 2001 2002
Partner  Country 2002
Partner  Country 2002
 
 17Table 2. The Shares of Payment Currencies in Korean Exports
(1) Visible Trade
ʢUnit: ˋʣ
US Dollar Yen Mark Pound
1976 99.08 0 0.25 0.37
1 9 8 0 9 52 . 1 51 . 5 80 . 4 5
1985 94.24 3.84 0.76 0.38
1990 88.21 7.44 2.2 0.87
1992 88.78 6.25 2.82 0.85
1994 88.86 6.41 2.58 0.50
1 9 9 68 9 . 15 . 1 32 . 2 10 . 9 8
1997 89.21 5.02 1.76 0.85
1998 88.54 4.95 2.66 0.97
1999 85.61 5.96 2.39 0.95
2000 84.76 5.39 1.8 0.67
2001 87.42 5.39 1.47 0.71
(2) Invisible Trade
ʢUnit: ˋʣ
US Dollar Yen Mark Pound
1976 83.86 5.73 2.09 0.29
1980 83.45 4.60 0.98 0.39
1985 87.78 8.86 0.97 0.41
1990 65.58 25.67 2.99 2.81
1992 67.79 22.51 3.65 2.06
1994 70.08 22.09 3.11 0.91
1996 75.48 17.18 2.40 0.80
1997 77.22 15.77 2.35 0.99
1998 77.79 16.32 1.79 0.67
1999 74.52 18.96 1.12 1.03
2000 75.87 16.27 0.65 1.23
2001 74.38 14.06 0.47 1.37
Sourcesʣ The Bank of Korea, Monthly Statistical Bulletin, various issues.
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 22Appendix 1:  Derivations of (7)-(10) and (11)-(14). 
 
  Equations (1)-(3) and (6) imply that ∂Π
E/∂ P* = ∂Π
I/∂ P* = ∂Π
0/∂ P*, ∂Π
I/∂ P*∂ s = ∂Π




2 P* = ∂
2Π
I/∂
2 P* = ∂
2Π
0/∂


















2 + 2 (∂
2Π
0/∂ P*∂ s0)(∂P*/∂ s0), 
(A3) Π22
I = Π22




























2 s) + 2 (∂
2Π
I/∂ P*∂ s)(∂P*/∂ s), 
(A8) Π22
E = Π22




2 + 2 [(∂
2Π
E/∂ P*∂ s) - (∂
2Π
I/∂ P*∂ s)](∂P*/∂ s), 
 
at s0 = E s0 and s = E s.  
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Appendix 2:  Derivations of (29)-(34) 
 














I/∂ s = A p














Since P* E s = p
E = p
I E s = p
0(E s /E s0) = A
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0/∂ P*∂ s0 = A µ (µ-1)  (s/s0) (P* s0/p
0)
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E/∂ P*∂ s = A µ
2 (P* s/p
E)
µ-1  – (µη)
 2 A
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I/∂ P*∂ s = Aµ (P*/p
I) 
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